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Wage Subsidies for Needy Job-Seekers and Their Effect on 
Individual Labour Market Outcomes after the German Reforms
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Our paper estimates the average effect of wage subsidies – paid to employers for a limited 
period of time – on the labour market prospects of needy job-seekers without access to 
insurance-paid ‘unemployment benefit I’. The results show that wage subsidies had large and 
significant favourable effects: 20 months after taking up a subsidised job, the share of 
persons in regular employment is nearly 40 percentage points higher across participants. On 
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At the beginning of 2005, the German system of unemployment compensation was fun-
damentally  reformed.  Since  then,  employable  needy  job-seekers  may  receive  a  new 
means-tested and tax-financed basic income support, called ‘unemployment benefit II’, 
while several active labour market programmes support their integration into the labour 
market. Targeted wage subsidies, paid to employers for a limited period of time, are one 
of the programmes that have been established already before the recent reform. First, 
they reduce labour costs and can compensate the firm for a temporary gap between a 
worker’s wage and his or her productivity. Second, a period of subsidisation might help 
previous unemployed persons to disclose their productivity to an employer. Neumark 
(2008) concludes that wage subsidies might be a policy worth considering, if one strives 
to improve economic self-sufficiency via increasing earnings. 
We  estimate  the  effect  of  targeted  wage subsidies on the subsequent labour market 
prospects of participating needy job-seekers who received unemployment benefits II. In 
particular, we ask whether taking up a subsidised job between February and April 2005 
had an impact on the percentage of participants who were a) in unsubsidised employ-
ment, b) not unemployed and c) not receiving unemployment benefits II during the sub-
sequent months. We apply statistical matching techniques and estimate programme ef-
fects by comparing participants with a group of similar needy job-seekers, who did not 
enter a subsidised job between February and April 2005.  
Our paper complements the recent literature mainly by four aspects: First, it is question-
able weather previous results on the effectiveness of wage subsidies will be valid for the 
new group of unemployment benefit II recipients. This group is very heterogeneous 
(Koch and Walwei, 2008) and has a comparatively low exit rate into regular work (Bach 
et al., 2008). The new legal framework emphasises the activation of unemployment 
benefit II recipients. Therefore, it is a highly relevant policy question, whether wage 
subsidies contribute to their integration into the labour market. Second, our paper identi-
fies heterogeneous effects for subgroups with different placement difficulties, taking up 
a subsidised job. Third, a further new feature of our analysis is that our data enable us to 
take into account also information on households and partners of unemployed persons, 
when estimating assignment probabilities. Fourth, we test the sensitivity of our esti-
mates regarding unobserved heterogeneity by conducting a Rosenbaum-bounds analysis. 
In Section II we will sketch the institutional background and characterise the analysed 
programme. Furthermore, we will briefly describe international evidence on the effec-  2 
tiveness  of  wage  subsidy  programmes.  Section  III  discusses  the  evaluation  strategy, 
while Section IV introduces data and variables as well as the applied method. The em-
pirical results are depicted in Section V. We draw some conclusions in Section VI.  
II.  INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
II.1.  Institutional Background and Programme Features 
A major part of the social reforms initiated in Germany during the years 2002 and 2003 
involved the system of unemployment compensation. Unemployed persons who had 
contributed to the German unemployment insurance system are eligible for unemploy-
ment benefits I (Arbeitslosengeld I), which amounts to as much as 67 percent of the lat-
est net income and is paid for a limited period of time. The legal basis for the unem-
ployment insurance system is the Social Code III (Sozialgesetzbuch III). Traditionally, 
the German Public Employment Service has been responsible for the administration of 
the unemployment insurance as well as for the job placement and programme assign-
ment of registered unemployed persons. 
When unemployment benefits were exhausted, former unemployment benefit recipients 
were supported prior to 2005 by means-tested and tax-financed unemployment assis-
tance (Arbeitslosenhilfe), where the amount was also conditional on former income. 
Needy persons without claims for unemployment insurance or unemployment assistance 
could apply for means-tested social assistance (Sozialhilfe), which was administered by 
municipalities. Even if capable of work, many of these needy persons were not regis-
tered as unemployed at the Public Employment Service.  
With the beginning of 2005 the Social Code II (Sozialgesetzbuch II) came into force: 
Former unemployment assistance was abolished. Now needy unemployed job-seekers 
and their household members are entitled to means-tested and tax-financed unemploy-
ment benefit II (Arbeitslosengeld II). Its amount does not depend on former income. 
Note that needy job-seekers and their household members are predominately registered 
as unemployed and may receive employment services. 
Since 2005, the administration of the new services for needy job-seekers is mostly con-
ducted jointly by the Public Employment Service and by municipalities. An exception 
was made for 69 municipalities who opted out of this cooperation and provide all ser-
vices for needy job-seekers on their own (Optierende Kommunen). Public Employment 
Services are now organised in two branches: (1) a tax-funded branch - based on the So-
cial Code II - for needy employable job-seekers and their households and (2) an insur-  3 
ance-funded branch - based on the Social Code III - for job-seekers who receive unem-
ployment benefits I or have not yet qualified for unemployment benefits I. Konle-Seidl 
(2008) and Stephan and Zickert (2008) discuss aspects of the new governance of em-
ployment services. 
Table 1 
Entries and average numbers in selected labour market programmes  
during 2000-2006 (in 1000) 
   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005*  2006* 
                  II/III  II  II/III  II 
Entries into programme                            
Wage subsidy (Eingliederungszuschüsse)  152  127  188  183  157  134  51  217  97 
Further vocational training (Förderung berufl. Weiterbildung)  523  442  455  255  185  132  66  247  103 
Public job creation I (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen, SAM)  318  246  215  179  161  80  62  80  62 
Public job creation II (Arbeitsgelegenheiten)  -  -  -  -  -  630  630  742  742 
Short-term training (Trainingsmaßnahmen)  485  551  865  1064  1188  894  410  978  444 
Contracting-out placement services (Beauftragung Dritter)**  -  -  -  -  635  426  273  301  148 
Average number in programme                            
Wage subsidy (Eingliederungszuschüsse)  105  118  136  153  110  60  21  82  68 
Further vocational training (Förderung berufl. Weiterbildung)  343  352  340  260  184  114  18  119  47 
Public job creation I (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen, SAM)  266  237  193  144  117  61  12  50  7 
Public job creation II (Arbeitsgelegenheiten)  -  -  -  -  -  201  201  293  293 
Short-term training (Trainingsmaßnahmen)  52  60  74  93  95  69  34  70  35 
Contracting-out placement services (Beauftragung Dritter)**  -  -  -  -  95  103  75  100  76 
Source:  Statistics  Department  of  the  German  Public  Employment  Service  (Data-Warehouse). 
*) II/III = Programmes covered by Social Code II (without municipalities opting out of the co-operation 
with the Public Employment Service) and Social Code III; II = Programmes covered by Social Code II.   
**) Figures are available since 2004, while different variants started already in 1998 (contracting-out 
subtasks of placement) respectively 2002 (contracting-out all placement services).  
In Germany, several active labour market programmes support the integration of unem-
ployed persons into the labour market. A comprehensive overview on these programmes 
and recent evaluation results can be found in Bernhard et al. (2008). For the period 2000 
to 2006, Table 1 shows entries and average numbers of participants in the most impor-
tant programmes, which were in 2005 extended to recipients of unemployment benefit II 
respectively introduced in particular for this group. The most important programmes 
covered by Social Code II since 2005 are certainly public job creation schemes (Hoh-
meyer and Wolff 2007) and short-term training (Wolff and Jozwiak 2007). Contracting-
out placement services to private providers (Bernhard and Wolff 2008), further voca-
tional training and targeted wage subsidies are less often used, but are still important 
instruments. During the first half of 2005, nearly one percent of the average number of 
needy job-seekers took up a subsidised job (Heinemann et al. 2006). Start-up subsidies 
are granted to unemployment benefit II recipients only through a newly installed small-
scale programme (Wolff and Nivorozhkin 2008).   4 
The decision to support an unemployed person with a targeted wage subsidy (Einglied-
erungszuschuss) lays in the discretion of the caseworker, who has – within the legal 
framework and guidelines of the local Employment Agency – also latitude in determin-
ing the amount and duration of the subsidy. The wage subsidy could at the most account 
for as much as 50 percent of the monthly wage or salary and continue for at most 12 
months. Extensions might be granted for handicapped or older workers.  
The employer is obliged to employ subsidised persons who are younger than 50 years 
for a follow-up period of further employment after the expiration of the subsidy (this 
period is usually as long as the period of subsidisation itself). If he dismisses the worker 
within this period for reasons not attributable to the worker, the employer may be asked 
to reimburse a part of the subsidy. 
Since the German labour market reforms, targeted wage subsidies has been granted for 
unemployment benefit I recipients covered by Social Code III as well as for needy job-
seekers – receiving unemployment benefits II – covered by Social Code II. Thus, it has 
been suspected that currently caseworkers for different groups of unemployed persons 
may find themselves in ‘subsidisation competition’ to secure jobs for their clients. This 
is a problem inherent in the current organisation of active labour market policies in 
Germany. A more integrated approach in supporting unemployed persons across the 
‘legal boundaries’ of the Social Code II and III would surely help to avoid this competi-
tion.  
II.2.  Brief Literature Review 
For Germany, wage subsidies have been analysed comprehensively as part of the so 
called ‘Hartz-evaluation’ of active labour market programmes (ZEW et al. 2005, 2006). 
As part of these studies, Bernhard et al. (2006) and Jaenichen and Stephan (2007) esti-
mated average treatment effects of a subsidy on previously unemployed individuals, 
using statistical matching techniques. They showed that taking up a subsidised job dur-
ing the second quarter of 2002 had significant and favourable effects on subsequent em-
ployment prospects of participants, compared to no or a later participation. Jaenichen 
(2002, 2005) found similar positive results for subsidised unemployed persons in 1999. 
While the comparison group in the cited studies were unsubsidised unemployed persons, 
Jaenichen and Stephan (2007) conduct also a comparison with individuals moving di-
rectly out of unemployment into unsubsidised employment. The results indicate that 
differences in the employment prospects between persons taking-up subsidised and un-
subsidised jobs were rather small after three years.    5 
The positive results are in line with the international literature on wage subsidies. For 
Sweden,  Sianesi (2008), Carling and Richardson (2004), Fredriksson and Johansson 
(2004) and Forslund et al. (2004) investigated the effects of wage subsidies on the la-
bour market prospects of previous unemployed participants. Regardless of the method 
used (statistical matching, event history analysis, instrumental variable difference-in-
difference techniques) the results suggested positive effects of the programmes. Dorsett 
(2006) evaluated the British ‘New Deal’ reform for young workers and showed that in 
the longer run the option to claim a wage subsidy dominated all other options in pre-
venting unemployment.  
For Belgium, Göbel (2007) applied a multivariate duration model with unobserved het-
erogeneity. He finds that participation in subsidised employment significantly shortens 
the duration until entry into unsubsidised employment. Furthermore, it significantly in-
creases the duration of the first employment spell, but has no significant effects on the 
duration of later unemployment periods. Also for Belgium, Cockx et al. (1998) esti-
mated duration models to analyse the effect of temporary wage subsidies on job tenure; 
they found positive, but insignificant effects. Similarly, Hamersma (2005) obtained in-
significant effects of a subsidy on job tenure for the State of Wisconsin, using statistical 
matching techniques.  
Summing up, most studies find that taking up a subsidised job has positive effects on 
subsequent employment prospects of previous unemployed participants. However, some 
effects cannot be identified by the research designs underlying the studies mentioned 
above (Calmfors 1994). First, a deadweight loss occurs, if several of those subsidised 
would have been recruited also without help of a subsidy. The underlying reason might 
be imperfect information on the side of the caseworker as well as collusion between the 
public employment office and the employer. Studies relying on a statistical matching 
approach might interpret the share of comparison group members that found a job with-
out the help of a subsidy as an indicator for the size of deadweight losses. Second, sub-
stitution effects prevail, if some of those taking up a subsidised job will merely replace 
other workers. Third, displacement effects may arise if employment in some firms in-
creases as a consequence of subsidisation, but at the expense of jobs in other firms, such 
that the only effect is displacement.  
Also as part of the German ‘Hartz-evaluation’ Boockmann et al. (2007) analysed the 
effect of changes in the legislation on wage subsidies for elder workers on the employ-
ment prospects of this group, thus taking advantage of a ‘natural experiment’. They used 
a difference-in-differences estimator to compare changes in transition probabilities be-  6 
tween the affected group and a comparison group comprised of slightly younger work-
ers. The authors found nearly no significant effects and concluded that deadweight ef-
fects – those subsidised would have been hired anyway – are a major problem of wage 
subsidies. However, only a comparatively small percentage of individuals in the ana-
lysed age groups actually received the subsidy. Moreover, underlying changes in legisla-
tion affected the maximum duration of the subsidy, whereas the actual mean duration of 
the subsidy decreased over time (Bernhard et al. 2007). 
III.  EVALUATION APPROACH 
We are interested in the mean effect of taking up subsidised employment between Feb-
ruary and April 2005 on the labour market outcomes of participants. To determine this 
effect we have to estimate the counterfactual outcomes of participants in the absence of 
a subsidy. Any attempt to estimate these counterfactuals has, however, to take into ac-
count that subsidised workers are not selected randomly from the group of unemployed 
persons. In the absence of an experimental design one usually strives to find a very simi-
lar group of non-participating individuals, whose outcomes can be interpreted as coun-
terfactual outcomes of the group of participants (Rubin 1974, Heckman et al. 1999).  
We will sketch the underlying idea briefly: In month t+h after programme entry in t 
every person is assumed to have two potential labour market outcomes: Y1
t+h is the po-
tential outcome if a person has taken up a subsidised job during February to April 2005, 
while Y0
t+h is the potential outcome in the case of non-participation. Participation in the 
programme is indicated by D
t = 1, non-participation by D
t = 0. To estimate the mean 
effect of taking up subsidised employment on the labour market prospects of partici-
pants, we assume that the participation of a person in the programme does not affect the 
potential outcomes of any other person (Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption). The 
so called average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is given by the expected differ-
ence in an individual’s two potential outcomes in t+h: 
  ATT
t+h   = E[Y1
t+h – Y0
t+h | D
t = 1]   (1) 
    = E[Y1
t+h | D
t = 1] – E[Y0
t+h | D
t = 1].  
The first term on the right-hand side E[Y1
t+h | D
t = 1] is just the mean of the observed 
outcomes of participants. However, to estimate potential outcomes of participants in the 
case of non-participation E[Y1
t+h | D
t = 0] we have to take into account that participants 
have at least managed to get a subsidised job, which implies that they have probably 
better labour market prospects than the average unemployed person.    7 
Statistical matching techniques provide a solution for this problem that relies on the 
Conditional Independence Assumption (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). We assume that 
the outcome in the case of non-participation does not differ between participants and 
non-participants, when both groups are identical in regard of a number of observable 
characteristics, summarised in the vector X. This is formally expressed as Y0
t+h ^ D
t | X, 
where ^ denotes statistical independence. The assumption is satisfied if X contains all 
variables that jointly influence selection into the programme as well as post-programme 
outcomes. An estimator for (1) is then given by 
  ATT
t+h = EX{E[Y1
t+h | X, D
t = 1] – E[Y0
t+h | X, D
t = 0]| D
t = 1}.  (2) 
We are thus basing the choice of our comparison group on a comprehensive number of 
variables, which will be described in detail in Section 4. The estimate is valid, however, 
only if there are in fact non-participants with characteristics similar to those of partici-
pants;  the  treated  have  to  be  within  ‘Common  Support’  of  the  comparison  group 
(Heckman et al. 1999).  
An important topic is the choice of the classification window in time, which defines 
which unemployed persons are classified as non-participating in a labour market pro-
gramme. Sianesi (2004) and Fredriksson and Johansson (2004) have pointed out that 
labour market programmes in Europe are ongoing and any unemployed is a potential 
participant at any point of time. Individuals may take up a subsidised job sooner or later 
provided they are still eligible. But the unemployed themselves or the caseworker may 
decide against taking part in the wage subsidy programme, because they expect or are 
expected to find an unsubsidised job soon. Thus selecting a comparison group of indi-
viduals who never participated in any programme would base selection on expected 
(successful) future outcomes, and matching conditional on observable individual charac-
teristics  might  not  suffice  to  remove  selectivity.  Steiger  (2004)  and  Stephan  (2008) 
show empirically that evaluation results vary with the choice of the classification win-
dow. Following the majority of the European literature, we do not put any restrictions 
on the future of persons and define non-participation as not taking up subsidised em-
ployment between February and April 2005, but eventually at a later date. 
For the programme investigated, a argument against the matching approach may be that 
we observe not solely labour market outcomes after receiving a subsidy, but rather la-
bour market outcomes of a subsidy in combination with a job offer (Jaenichen and 
Stephan 2007): First, the fact that someone has been able to find at least a subsidised 
job, implies that – even conditioning on X – there might be still unobserved individual   8 
heterogeneity between participating persons and non-participating comparison persons. 
This might capture, for instance, the motivation of unemployed individuals and the as-
sessment of their skills by caseworkers and firms. However, unobserved heterogeneity 
will be strongly correlated with observed explaining variables, in particular an individ-
ual’s labour market history (Heckman et al. 1999). Since we have comprehensive in-
formation on previous employment histories of unemployed persons as well as of their 
partners this should at least strongly alleviate the problem at hand. Furthermore, we 
conduct a Rosenbaum bounds analysis (Rosenbaum 2002) to estimate how strongly an 
unobserved variable would have to influence the assignment process to undermine the 
results of the matching analysis. Second, subsidised and unsubsidised jobs might be 
concentrated in different employer segments of the labour market. Since our data do not 
contain information on employer characteristics, the matching of workers to heteroge-
neous firms may involve a selection bias (of unknown direction) regarding job quality.  
IV.  DATA AND APPLIED METHOD 
IV.1. Data and Variables 
Our empirical analysis uses rich administrative data of the German Public Employment 
Service.  The  Integrated  Employment  Biographies  (Integrierte  Erwerbsbiographien, 
IEB, versions 5.1/6.0) contain socio-demographic characteristics and individual daily 
information about employment history, receipt of benefits, job search history and par-
ticipation on several programmes of active labour market policy. Hummel et al. (2005) 
and Jacobebbinghaus and Seth (2007) describe a sample of the database that is open for 
public use through the Research Data Centre of the Public Employment Service. Addi-
tional information about unemployment benefit II receipt and household structure are 
drawn from a history-file on means-tested benefit receipt (Leistungshistorik Grundsi-
cherung, LHG, versions 2.0/3.0). Since the latter dataset provides household informa-
tion, we were able to merge partner information to the individual employment biogra-
phies. We thus account not only for the individual employment history, but for the part-
ner’s employment history, when modelling selection into subsidised employment. Fur-
thermore, we merge the latest information on the employment status from data marts of 
the Statistics Department of the Federal Employment Service to compute our outcome 
variables, which are explained in more detail below.  
The potential treatment group consists of all persons who have been registered as unem-
ployed covered by Social Code II on January 31, 2005, and whose subsidised employ-
ment started between February and April 2005. The potential comparison group mem-  9 
bers consist of a 19 percent sample of all unemployed persons covered by Social Code II 
on 31 January, 2005. Both, treatment and comparison group are restricted to unem-
ployed persons who receive unemployment benefit II, were not older than 57 years, did 
not participate in any active labour market programme on January 31 2005, and did not 
have missing data in basic socio-demographic characteristics like age, sex, occupational 
qualification and migration background. As has already been mentioned, potential com-
parison group members may not take-up subsidised employment between February and 
April 2005, but eventually at a later date. Furthermore, from 2005 onwards, data sets 
from those 69 municipalities opting out of co-operation with the Public Employment 
Service (optierende Kommunen) have not been integrated in our databases yet. Thus we 
exclude districts, where only municipalities administer unemployment benefit II receipt 
from further analysis. 
Figure 1 
Entries into subsidisation covered by Social Code II  
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Source: Own calculations, based on IEB V5.01 and V6.01, LHG V2.0 and V3.0, data marts of the Statis-
tics Department of the Federal Employment Agency, without municipalities opting out of co-operation 
with the Public Employment Service. 
We are convinced that a programme is not only characterised by its type, but also by its 
length.  Figure  1  shows  that around fifty percent of the subsidies in our sample are 
granted for four to six months and around thirty percent for up to three months. The 
share of long-term subsidies is somewhat higher in East Germany than in West Ger-  10 
many, probably because of weak labour market conditions in East Germany. Since our 
observation period is restricted to 20 months after programme entry, we restrict our 
analysis on wage subsidies of short-term duration (up to three month) and of medium-
term duration (four to six months). 
Furthermore,  separate  analyses  are  conducted  for  four  main  groups,  conducted  of 
women and men in East Germany or West Germany. For our largest treatment group, 
men in West Germany, we present results also by age, occupational qualification, migra-
tion background and (for those older than 30) time since the end of the last regular job. 
We use the variables depicted in Table 2 to model selection into the programme as well 
as post-programme outcomes.  
Table 2 
Explaining variables 
  Variables 
Socio-demographic individ-
ual characteristics  Age, migration background, health restrictions, qualification. 
Individual labour market 
history during the last five 
years 
Duration of employment/unemployment/not observable states like out of 
labour force, participation in active labour market programmes, receipt of 
unemployment assistance during December 2004, characteristics on the 
last job (earnings, full/part time, job duration). 
Household characteristics  Single/partner, children, partner’s qualification. 
Partner’s labour market 
history during the last five 
years 
Duration of employment/unemployment/not observable states like out of 
labour force, participation in active labour market programmes. 
Local labour market charac-
teristics 
Unemployment rate in 1/2005 and its percentage change during the pre-
ceding year, share of long-term unemployed in 1/2005 and its percentage 
change during the preceding year, vacancy-unemployment ratio in 1/2005 
and its percentage change during the preceding year, type of district (clas-
sification by Rüb and Werner 2007). 
Interaction effects  Individual labour market history by age, partner’s labour market history by 
age. 
 
Our outcome variables are measured at the beginning of each month, up to the 20
th 
month after (hypothetical) programme entry. To compute outcome variables for com-
parison group members, it is necessary to assign them potential programme start dates; 
we compute these as a random draw from the observed distribution of programme start 
months of the treatment group. All outcomes are defined as successful events, thus posi-
tive average treatment effects will indicate a positive impact of the wage subsidy. In 
particular, our outcome variables are:   11 
a)  Unsubsidised regular employment that is subject to social insurance contributions, 
b)  Not registered as unemployed and not participating in an active labour market pro-
gramme, 
c)  Not receiving unemployment benefits II. 
Note that our evaluation approach implies that participants are sampled conditional on 
their unemployment exit, while the non-participants, by definition, are unemployed at 
the beginning of the evaluation period (Jaenichen 2002). Therefore, when computing 
our outcome-variables a) and b), we do not interpret times of subsidised employment 
and the obligatory follow-up period of further employment already as a labour market 
success. Regarding outcome variable c), times of subsidised employment are subject to 
the usual social security contributions. Thus, subsidised employment will contribute to 
meet eligibility criteria for unemployment benefit I receipt. If a previously subsidised 
worker becomes unemployed and fulfils these criteria, he might avoid further unem-
ployment benefits II receipt. Unlike outcome variable a) and b), which refer only to the 
individual level outcome, variable c) refers to the household level. Note that persons 
might even work in a subsidised job and receive unemployment benefit II at the same 
time, if earnings are not sufficiently high to support a large family. 
Table A.1 in the Appendix shows variable means of selected explanatory variables for 
subsidised workers as well as for our samples of potential comparison persons. Subsi-
dised persons might be regarded to be a positive selection compared to all unemployed. 
In  particular,  younger  unemployed  persons,  highly  skilled  unemployed,  individuals 
without migration background and needy job-seekers who were employed last during 
2004 are overrepresented among the participants. Thus there seems to be some cream 
skimming in the assignment of wage subsidies. 
IV.2. Applied Method 
Propensity-score matching is a useful simplification of matching on a high-dimensional 
vector of X-variables. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have shown that it is sufficient to 
match on the propensity score Pr(X) = Pr(D
t = 1|X) to obtain the same probability distri-
bution  for  treated  and  non-treated  individuals.  Thus,  if  (Y0
t+h,Y1
t+h  ^  D




t) | Pr(X) will also be satisfied. Thus we estimate in a first step the pro-
pensity score for participants and non-participants by means of a probit model, with X as 
the vector of exogenous variables. The second step consists of a selection of a compari-
son group such that the distributions of the propensity scores are balanced for partici-  12 
pants and controls. Estimates are performed using the stata-module psmatch2 (Leuven 
and Sianesi 2003). 
For each group - for instance, West German women, who received a short-term subsidy 
- we estimate several probit models. We begin with the entire set of covariates and se-
lect variable sets that enter the next estimation step: In the first step, a set of covariates 
is kept in the model, if a Wald-Test on the hypothesis that their parameters are jointly 
zero indicates that the variable set has a significant impact with a = 0.5. During further 
steps this threshold value is decreased down to a = 0.1. Propensity scores are then com-
puted  for  the  remaining  group  specific  model  by  always  accounting  for  socio-
demographic characteristics independent on the results of the preceding test procedure. 
We apply six different matching algorithms to check for sensitivity of the outcomes: 
1) One-to-one nearest neighbour matching without replacement and caliper 0.001, 2) 
one-to-one nearest neighbour matching with replacement and caliper 0.001, 3) one-to-
two nearest neighbour matching with replacement and caliper 0.001, 4) one-to-three 
nearest neighbour matching with replacement and caliper 0.001, 5) radius matching with 
caliper 0.001 as well as 6) radius matching with caliper 0.0005. Note that average treat-
ment effects computed with different matching algorithms hardly differ from each other.  
To test for the quality of matching, the mean standardised bias (MSB) (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin 1983) between each treated group and its matched comparison group is computed 
across all variables in X. The standardised bias of a covariate is defined as the difference 
of means in the treated and matched control sample, divided by the square root of the 
average sample variance. Thus a lower value of the MSB indicates more similarity be-
tween the two groups. In the following we will only present results for the procedures 
that generally obtain the smallest standardised bias (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985). These 
are  radius  matching  with  caliper  0.001  for  medium-term  subsidies  and  with  caliper 
0.0005 for short-term subsidies. The MSB after matching never rises above 2.1 percent 
(Figure  2).  Moreover,  also  t-tests  (not  displayed  here)  show  that  the  hypothesis  on 
equality of means of the covariates cannot be rejected after matching. Hence, we achieve 
a good balancing of the distributions of the explaining variables across treatment and 
comparison group. 
Finally, one might argue that caseworkers and employers, who have to decide to grant a 
subsidy respectively to recruit a subsidised worker, will probably have additional infor-
mation – not included in our dataset – about the job-seeker. This information might have 
an impact on treatment probability and labour market outcomes, but is not included in   13 
the data set. We analyse therefore, how sensitive the estimated treatment effects are to a 
violation of the Conditional Independence Assumption. For this purpose we apply the 
stata module mhbounds (Becker and Caliendo 2007) – available for nearest neighbour 
matching without replacement – to compute the Mantel-Haenszel statistics for the out-
comes in each month after assignment.  
Table 3 
Rosenbaum-bounds analysis for the outcome variable ‘not unemployed and not partici-
pating in an active labour market programme’, 20 months after programme entry 
   Short-term subsidy  Medium-term subsidy 
Men in East Germany  2.8  3.5 
Women in East Germany  5.0  3.6 
Men in West Germany  1.8  2.9 
Women in West Germany  2.2  2.7 
Source: Own calculations, based on IEB V5.01 and V6.01, LHG V2.0 and V3.0, data marts of the Statistics 
Department  of  the  Federal  Employment  Agency,  without  municipalities  that  opted  out.  
Note: Short-term subsidies are paid for up to 3 months, medium-term subsidies are paid for 4 to 6 months. 
The Table displays the factor by which unobserved heterogeneity would have to influence selection into 
subsidised employment to undermine matching results. 
Table 3 reports odd ratios for men and women in East and West Germany; it restricts 
itself to the outcome variable ‘not unemployed and not participating in an active labour 
market programme’ and the 20th month after programme entry. The treatment effects of 
short-term subsidies up to three months are significantly different from zero on a level 
of a = 0.05 for odd ratios between 1.8 and 5.0. For treatment effects of medium-term 
subsidies between four and six months the odd ratios range from 2.9 to 3.6. The inter-
pretation is, for instance, for a value of 1.8 that the results are insensitive to a bias that 
would nearly double the odds of treatment. Thus results are quite robust with respect to 
a potential violation of the Conditional Independence Assumption. 
V.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
V.1.  Effects for the Main Groups 
Figure 2 displays in detail the evolution of the estimated average treatment effects over 
time. Plots above the abscissa have to be interpreted as a ‘success’ of the wage subsidy. 
Remember that the period of subsidisation as well as the following period, during which 
the employer is obliged to sustain the employment relationship, are not interpreted as a 
‘labour market success’ when computing employment and unemployment outcomes.    14 
Figure 2 
Estimated average treatment effects of a subsidy on the labour market prospects of needy job-
seekers taking up a subsidised job 
Short-term subsidy (up to 3 months) 
379 treated / 58718 controls
Mean bias before matching: 18.1


















































1 6 12 18
Months since start of treatment
Men in East Germany
234 treated / 48024 controls
Mean bias before matching: 18.8


















































1 6 12 18
Months since start of treatment
Women in East Germany
698 treated / 89849 controls
Mean bias before matching: 14


















































1 6 12 18
Months since start of treatment
Men in West Germany
304 treated / 64270 controls
Mean bias before matching: 19.7


















































1 6 12 18
Months since start of treatment
Women in West Germany
 
Medium-term subsidy (4 to 6 months)  
732 treated / 60557 controls
Mean bias before matching: 15.1


















































1 6 12 18
Months since start of treatment
Men in East Germany
566 treated / 50535 controls
Mean bias before matching: 16.8


















































1 6 12 18
Months since start of treatment
Women in East Germany
1133 treated / 94411 controls
Mean bias before matching: 12.8


















































1 6 12 18
Months since start of treatment
Men in West Germany
412 treated / 69508 controls
Mean bias before matching: 19.8


















































1 6 12 18
Months since start of treatment
Women in West Germany
 
 
Source: Own calculations, based on IEB V5.01 and V6.01, LHG V2.0 and V3.0, data marts of the Statistics De-
partment of the Federal Employment Agency, without municipalities opting out of co-operation with the Public 
Employment Service.   15 
As can be seen clearly, treated persons were ‘locked-in’ – as a necessary side-effect of 
the construction of the outcome variables – for the period of subsidisation and for the 
compulsory period of further employment. We find large and significant positive effects 
of the wage subsidy on the labour market prospects of participants immediately after the 
end of the follow-up period, which then decline slightly over time. In fact, the highest 
treatment effect of 63 percentage points is found for women in East Germany, seven 
months after the start of a short-term subsidy.  
Table 4 
Treated individuals taking up a subsidised job during 2/2005 to 4/2005 and matched 
comparison persons: Labour market outcome and estimated average treatment effect on 
the treated (ATT) 20 months after start of the subsidised job 
      Short-term subsidy  Medium-term subsidy 
      East  West  East  West 
      Men  Wo.  Men  Wo.  Men  Wo.  Men  Wo. 
Treated  0.64  0.69  0.62  0.66  0.68  0.67  0.63  0.67 
Comparisons  0.31  0.23  0.32  0.29  0.28  0.23  0.29  0.26 
a) in regular 
employment 
ATT  0.33  0.45  0.30  0.37  0.40  0.45  0.35  0.40 
Treated  0.72  0.79  0.69  0.76  0.74  0.73  0.72  0.76 
Comparisons  0.43  0.39  0.47  0.49  0.40  0.38  0.44  0.47 
b) not unem-
ployed and not in 
programme  ATT  0.29  0.40  0.22  0.28  0.34  0.35  0.28  0.29 
Treated  0.63  0.53  0.68  0.69  0.64  0.59  0.71  0.67 







c) not receiving 
unemployment 
benefit II  ATT  0.35  0.30  0.31  0.35  0.38  0.36  0.37  0.35 
Before  18.1  18.8  14.0  19.7  15.1  16.8  12.8  19.8  Mean standardised 
bias  After  0.8  1.7  0.6  1.4  0.9  1.4  0.8  2.1 
All  381  236  699  304  735  568  1134  412  Observations of  
treated persons  In Support  379  234  698  304  732  566  1133  412 
Source: Own calculations, based on IEB V5.01 and V6.01, LHG V2.0 and V3.0, data marts of the Statis-
tics Department of the Federal Employment Agency, without municipalities opting out of co-operation 
with the Public Employment Service.   
Note: Short-term subsidies are paid for up to 3 months, while medium-term subsidies are paid for 4 to 6 
months. All estimated average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) are significant at a = 0.01.. 
Our main empirical results – for month 20 after treatment start – are also summarised in 
Table 4. It documents the labour market outcomes as share of treated and of matched 
comparison persons a) in regular employment, b) not unemployed (or in a labour market 
programme) and c) no longer receiving unemployment benefit II. Furthermore, the table 
displays average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) that are computed simply as the 
difference between labour market outcomes of treated and matched comparison groups. 
20 months after taking up the subsidised job, the share of participants in regular em-
ployment exceeds 60 percent in all treated groups. Furthermore, it is in most cases   16 
nearly 40 percentage points higher than in the comparison groups. While still more par-
ticipants – more than 70 percent – are neither unemployed nor in any labour market pro-
gramme, the difference to comparison groups is obviously slightly smaller than looking 
at employment outcomes: A comparatively higher share of comparison persons than of 
treated persons withdraws from the labour market as discouraged workers. Finally, also 
more than 60 percent of the treated do not receive unemployment benefit II for needy 
job-seekers any longer; the average treatment effect on the treated accounts for 35 per-
centage points. 
Comparisons of estimates between the groups investigated must be interpreted with cau-
tion, since characteristics of group members may differ for each group. Nonetheless we 
would like to draw attention to several aspects:  
First, labour market outcomes do not differ much between recipients of short- and me-
dium-term wage subsidies. Thus, it seems that the duration of the subsidy is not neces-
sarily a function of placement difficulties. Treatment effects are mostly higher within 
groups receiving a medium-term subsidy compared to those receiving a short-term sub-
sidy, if we look at the beginning of the observation period or at its end. However, if we 
concentrate at the expiration date of the follow-up period, short-term subsidies seem to 
be more effective than medium-term subsidies: In the first month after the follow-up 
period had expired (7
th month for short- and 13
th month for medium-term subsidies 
since start of treatment), the effects for short-term subsidies are up to nine percentage 
points higher than for medium-term subsidies.  
Second, estimated treatment effects for the outcome variables ‘regular employed’ and 
‘not unemployed and not in a labour market programme’ are in the majority of points in 
time slightly larger a) for female than for male workers and b) for East Germany than 
for West Germany. The results are mainly due to varying labour market results of the 
unsubsidised comparison groups – women as well as unemployed workers in East Ger-
many have in general worse labour market prospects than male and West German needy 
job-seekers.  
Third, Table 4 shows that the share of participating persons ‘not receiving unemploy-
ment benefit II’ 20 months after programme start is either higher or rather similar to the 
share  in  ‘regular  employment’.  Noticeable  exceptions  are  women  in  East  Germany, 
whose share in regular employment is considerably higher than the share for those not 
receiving benefits (8 percentage points for medium- and 15 for short-term subsidies).   17 
This may be a hint that several of these women are working in low wage jobs and re-
ceive additional benefits to increase their household income.  
Table 5 
Subgroups of treated West German men taking up a subsidised job during 2/2005 to 
4/2005 and matched comparison persons: Labour market outcome and estimated aver-








































































































































































































































































Short-term subsidy                   
Treated  0.64  0.59  0.66  0.59  0.63  0.60  0.59  0.64 
Comparisons  0.36  0.27  0.34  0.24  0.32  0.28  0.27  0.35 
a) in regular em-
ployment 
ATT  0.27  0.32  0.32  0.35  0.30  0.32  0.32  0.29 
Treated  0.67  0.69  0.75  0.66  0.68  0.74  0.68  0.71 
Comparisons  0.50  0.41  0.47  0.39  0.47  0.45  0.42  0.50 
b) not unem-
ployed and not in 
programme  ATT  0.17  0.28  0.28  0.27  0.21  0.29  0.26  0.21 
Treated  0.66  0.68  0.69  0.69  0.71  0.58  0.61  0.73 







c) not receiving 
unemployment 
benefit II  ATT  0.27  0.37  0.34  0.39  0.34  0.25  0.32  0.32 
Before  16.16  16.15  15.51  16.23  16.33  17.23  16.61  16.30  Mean standardised bias 
(MSB)  After  0.65  0.89  0.63  1.04  0.69  1.50  1.06  0.60 
All  299  313  248  173  553  146  262  453  Observations of  
treated persons  In Support  297  313  248  173  552  146  262  452 
Medium-term subsidy                 
Treated  0.65  0.62  0.64  0.64  0.64  0.61  0.57  0.68 
Comparisons  0.34  0.24  0.32  0.22  0.30  0.26  0.23  0.32 
a) in regular em-
ployment 
ATT  0.32  0.39  0.32  0.42  0.34  0.35  0.34  0.35 
Treated  0.76  0.70  0.73  0.69  0.73  0.71  0.67  0.76 
Comparisons  0.47  0.38  0.44  0.38  0.45  0.44  0.40  0.47 
b) not unem-
ployed and not in 
programme  ATT  0.29  0.31  0.28  0.32  0.28  0.27  0.27  0.29 
Treated  0.72  0.67  0.68  0.71  0.72  0.66  0.62  0.76 







c) not receiving 
unemployment 
benefit II  ATT  0.36  0.39  0.34  0.43  0.37  0.35  0.35  0.38 
Before  15.06  14.21  12.16  19.13  15.10  13.86  12.97  13.25  Mean standardised bias 
(MSB)  After  0.72  1.01  0.62  1.25  0.74  1.96  1.82  0.56 
All  471  515  401  251  885  222  398  709  Observations of  
treated persons  In Support  471  514  400  251  885  222  398  709 
Source: Own calculations, based on IEB V5.01 and V6.01, LHG V2.0 and V3.0, data marts of the Statis-
tics Department of the Federal Employment Agency, without municipalities opting out of co-operation 
with the Public Employment Service.   
Note: Short-term subsidies are paid for up to 3 months, medium-term subsidies for 4 to 6 months. All 
estimated average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) are significant at a = 0.01.   18 
Note finally that the share of the comparison group that has taken-up unsubsidised em-
ployment – indicating which share of participants should (at least) have also found a job 
without the help of a subsidy - may be interpreted as deadweight losses of subsidisation. 
This implies that the deadweight accompanying wage subsidies for needy job-seekers 
would amount to at least 20 to 30 percentage points. 
V.2.  Effects for Subgroups of West German Men 
Treatment effects might be heterogeneous for unemployed with different characteristics. 
For male needy job-seekers in West Germany, our number of observations is sufficiently 
high to perform separate estimates across subgroups. The results are displayed in Table 
5 and show that effects differ across groups.  
In particular, estimated treatment effects on subsidised persons were larger  
a) for needy job-seekers between 35 and 49 than for those between 25 and 34 years, and 
b) for needy job-seekers older than 30 who were of employment for more than one year 
than for those without job for less than one year.  
Since the effectiveness of wage subsidies has been higher for several groups with par-
ticular placement difficulties, one might conclude that subsidies create an opportunity 
for in particular hard-to-place individuals to disclose their potential productivity to an 
employer. 
V.3.  Comparison with Findings for the Pre-Reform Period 
Does the effectiveness of wage subsidies differ between needy job-seekers in the post-
reform period and the entire group of unemployed persons in the pre-reform period? 
Table 6 displays findings of ZEW et al. (2006), where several groups of individuals – 
consisting of unemployment benefit recipients as well as unemployment assistance re-
cipients – taking up a subsidised job during the second quarter of 2002 were analysed. 
Results are shown for 20 months as well as 36 months after programme start.  
The effects of a subsidy on the subsequent employment rates of participants 20 months 
after programme start are partly higher, partly lower across the investigated groups of 
needy job-seekers. However, the effects on rates ‘not unemployed or in a labour market 
programme’ are in most groups investigated larger across recipients of unemployment 
benefit II than they were in the pre-reform period.    19 
Table 6 
Treated individuals taking up a subsidised job during the second quarter of 2002 and 
matched comparison persons: Labour market status and estimated average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT) 20 months and 36 months after start of the subsidised job 
         Short-term subsidy  Medium-term subsidy  Medium-term subsidy 
 
 
     training requirements  training requirements  for hard-to-place 
 
 
     East  West  East  West  East  West 
 
       Men  Wo.  Men  Wo.  Men  Wo.  Men  Wo.  Men  Wo.  Men  Wo. 
20 months after programme start                            
Treated  0.62  0.62  0.65  0.69  0.70  0.73  0.62  0.71  0.54  0.62  0.50  0.62 
Comparisons  0.40  0.28  0.29  0.30  0.34  0.26  0.31  0.27  0.23  0.15  0.21  0.21 
a) in regular 
employment 
ATT  0.22  0.34  0.36  0.39  0.36  0.47  0.31  0.43  0.31  0.47  0.29  0.41 
Treated  0.66  0.69  0.72  0.77  0.74  0.77  0.71  0.81  0.60  0.67  0.60  0.72 








ployed and not in 
programme  ATT  0.13  0.30  0.24  0.20  0.28  0.37  0.22  0.23  0.24  0.39  0.19  0.22 
36 months after programme start                                     
Treated  0.61  0.68  0.61  0.69  0.67  0.71  0.62  0.65  0.50  0.65  0.50  0.56 
Comparisons  0.42  0.33  0.35  0.36  0.33  0.35  0.34  0.32  0.24  0.24  0.23  0.23 
a) in regular 
employment 
ATT  0.19  0.35  0.26  0.33  0.34  0.36  0.28  0.33  0.26  0.42  0.27  0.34 
Treated  0.67  0.74  0.71  0.79  0.73  0.77  0.75  0.80  0.60  0.72  0.62  0.73 








ployed and not in 
programme  ATT  0.11  0.20  0.14  0.11  0.23  0.21  0.17  0.11  0.15  0.28  0.15  0.14 
Observations  949  346  948  562  2462  1266  1106  1019  339  242  1269  597 
Source: ZEW et al. (2006), Table A.4.4.   
Note: Short-term subsidies are paid for up to 3 months, while medium-term subsidies are paid for 4 to 6 
months. All estimated average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) are significant at a = 0.05. 
That may be cautiously taken as a hint that wage subsidies are not less effective for re-
cipients of basic social care than they were for former recipients of unemployment bene-
fit or unemployment assistance. Note also that the cited study showed that estimated 
treatment effects decrease further between 20 and 36 months after taking up a subsidised 
job, but remain still significant at a = 0.05 at the end of the observation period. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
As we have noted in the introduction, it has not been obvious ex-ante that previous re-
sults on the effectiveness of wage subsidies would hold also for needy jobseekers re-
ceiving unemployment benefits II, a group that as such exists in Germany only since 
2005. Our study presents a first assessment of the effectiveness of wages subsidies for 
this group, which now encompasses the majority of unemployed persons in Germany. 
Our results suggest that short and medium-term targeted wage subsidies improve the 
subsequent labour market prospects of needy job-seekers in Germany: 20 months after 
taking up a subsidised job the share of treated persons in regular employment is around 
40 percentage points higher than within comparison groups. The estimated effects on   20 
the shares not unemployed and the share not receiving basic social care any longer are 
slightly  smaller.  Groups  with  particular  placement  difficulties  benefit  comparatively 
more from subsidisation. Furthermore, the results do not differ much from those ob-
tained for participants from the entire group of unemployed persons during the pre-
reform period. 
These overall positive findings are in line with results for the pre-reform period in Ger-
many and with international results on the effectiveness of wage subsidies. Nonetheless, 
some caveats are in order: First, effectiveness of a programme on the individual level 
does not imply that the programme is also cost-efficient; our data contain, however, no 
individual information on the amount of the subsidy. Second, deadweight losses will be 
a serious problem, if considerable shares of participating persons might have got the job 
also without subsidisation. It might be less severe for subsidised hard-to-place workers 
and if the allocation of subsidies is monitored carefully by caseworkers. Third, our ap-
plied method does not take into account potential displacement and substitution effects 
(Calmfors, 1994). Subsidised persons will at least partly substitute other workers, but 
these effects might only be identified on the macro level. Fourth, an arbitrarily expan-
sion of the programme is prevented since wage subsidies can be granted only if a firm is 
willing to recruit the unemployed person in question. Finally, some groups with particu-
lar placement difficulties seem to benefit comparatively more from subsidisation; thus 
an extension of the programme on other groups might decrease its effectiveness. 
To conclude, it is a highly relevant policy question, how employment prospects of em-
ployable needy job seekers might be improved. Although the points made above high-
light that the instrument has to be applied carefully, our study supports the view that 
time-limited targeted wage subsidies are an effective means to foster economic self-
sufficiency of previously unemployed and needy workers, who participate in the pro-
gramme.   21 
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APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL TABLES 
Table A.1 
Variable means of selected attributes (0 = no, 1 = yes) in percent for potential comparison (PC) and treated (T) persons. 
   Short-term subsidy  Medium-term subsidy 
   East  West  East  West 
   Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women 
   PC  T  PC  T  PC  T  PC  T  PC  T  PC  T  PC  T  PC  T 
Age < 25  11  15  11  19  10  13  12  15  10  18  10  16  10  11  12  14 
Age 25-34  23  32  21  27  24  36  24  30  23  30  22  27  24  33  25  26 
Age 35-49  47  46  48  48  47  45  45  51  47  43  48  49  47  47  46  51 
Age 50-57  20  6  20  6  19  6  18  5  20  10  20  8  19  9  18  9 
Migration background  8  4  9  3  25  21  26  13  8  4  9  2  24  20  25  13 
Childless single  62  61  30  36  62  62  36  51  62  61  30  32  62  63  35  49 
Couple  9  8  10  8  5  5  7  5  9  11  10  7  5  5  7  7 
Lone parent  2  1  24  25  1  2  21  27  2  2  24  29  1  1  21  22 
Married   27  30  36  29  31  31  35  16  27  26  36  32  31  30  35  21 
Without qualification  13  3  13  2  22  12  28  4  13  3  13  2  22  12  27  6 
Lower secondary school  12  6  11  2  27  19  27  19  12  7  11  3  27  20  27  17 
Vocational training  29  28  20  10  29  41  19  29  29  25  20  12  30  37  20  30 
Higher secondary school   6  4  7  5  6  6  8  5  6  4  7  4  6  4  7  5 
with vocational training/higher education  40  60  48  81  16  21  18  43  40  60  48  79  16  27  19  42 
Last regular job 2004  24  42  28  42  23  35  26  40  24  35  28  45  22  37  26  38 
Last regular job 2002/2003  17  14  14  16  21  25  17  20  17  18  14  15  22  23  17  22 
Last regular job before 2002  37  9  38  10  34  7  34  9  37  12  38  12  35  13  34  13 


















































































Source: based on IEB V5.01 and V6.01, LHG V2.0 and V3.0, data marts of the Statistics Department of the Federal Employment Agency, without municipalities opting 
out of co-operation with the Public Employment Service.   
Note: Short-term subsidies are paid for up to 3 months, while medium-term subsidies are paid for 4 to 6 months. 